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UNCONSCIONABILITY SHOULD NOT BE THE SOLE
ARBITER OF WHETHER TO ENFORCE MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
James Morsch*

D

iscussions about whether companies should be able to force
consumers to arbitrate their claims are often side-tracked by a
debate about the desirability of class actions as a means of ensuring
compliance with laws that the government has neither the resources nor the willingness to enforce. This is because arbitration
simply cannot accommodate the procedures and complexities inherent in class actions and is instead designed to resolve individual
claims. For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which governs class actions filed in federal court, putative class
members who are not direct participants in the case are required
to receive notices about the proceedings and, under modern jurisprudence, a public hearing to decide whether a class should be certified.1 None of these procedures would appear to be possible in
arbitration since, by its very nature, arbitration is a confidential
proceeding.
What is lost in this debate is something on which most observers agree: the consumer “contracts” where companies bury
their mandatory arbitration provisions are classic contracts of adhesion. They are non-negotiable form contracts where one party
has vastly superior bargaining power over the other. Typically, the
provisions are very broad in scope, requiring consumers to arbitrate “all disputes arising from the sale, condition or performance”
of the product or service sold.2 Consumers do not bargain over
their terms. Nor do most consumers read these contracts and those
who do are unlikely to focus on the dispute resolution provisions.
Indeed, these “contracts” are not what most people would consider
* Adjunct Professor, Loyola University Law School; Partner, Butler
Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP.
1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
2
Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. America, LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284
(9th Cir. 2017).
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contracts at all, an agreement contemporaneous with the sale
whereby the seller provides a product or service in return for the
consumer’s consent to arbitration. Many of the mandatory arbitration provisions in use are provided to consumers as part of a
shrink-wrap agreement or owner’s manual sent to consumers after
they purchase the product or service at issue. The odds of a consumer reading a mandatory arbitration provision after she has
made her buying decision are extremely low. The chances of that
same consumer taking some action to negotiate or opt out of such
a provision by returning the product is, if possible, even more remote.
The question is whether we should care that mandatory arbitration provisions are contracts of adhesion. I believe we should,
at least in situations where the consumer’s claim exceeds a certain
monetary threshold, namely the amount of money that would be
enough to attract a reasonably priced lawyer to handle the consumer’s claim on an individual basis. It is in those situations that
a consumer’s unwitting agreement to an “adhesive” mandatory arbitration provision has the greatest adverse impact on her due process rights. The law does not favor the implied waiver of due process rights, and that is exactly what happens when a consumer is
forced to arbitrate a claim that she otherwise could have prosecuted in court with the assistance of a lawyer.
I. MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER
CONTRACTS ARE CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
As one state supreme court has stated, contracts of adhesion
are “a fact of modern life.”3 But so is texting while driving, and we
do not condone that practice. Currently, state laws do not generally
prohibit contracts of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is only unenforceable if it is either procedurally or substantively unconscionable. A company that effectively hides a mandatory arbitration
provision by burying it in small print or in a place a reasonable
consumer would not know to look is being procedurally unfair and
risks that the provision will not be enforced. An agreement is substantively unfair when it is so one-sided as to be oppressive or impossible for a reasonable person to understand. For example, a provision that requires a consumer to arbitrate in a forum that is either
geographically impractical or inordinately expensive given the
stakes of the claim at issue may be voided by a court. Similarly, an
3

Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2006).
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agreement to arbitrate that can only be understood by a lawyer is
vulnerable to challenge.
Companies that depend on sales to consumers but want to
avoid becoming embroiled in class actions generally understand
these rules and utilize arbitration clauses that pass muster both
procedurally and substantively. Those that do not – and there are
still plenty of companies that overreach or bury the clauses in the
fine print for reasons that are difficult to understand – deserve to
be sued over the enforceability of those clauses. But should that be
the end of our discussion? Should the outer bounds of mandatory
arbitration agreements be defined solely by reference to law of the
state law of unconscionability?
Unconscionability is a contract principle.4 A contract requires assent by each party to the contract and to each of the contract’s terms. As discussed above, we know that consumers do not
read and therefore, at best, only impliedly assent to mandatory arbitration provisions used by many sellers of consumer products
and services. The law normally does not allow the implied waiver
of a legal right unless the person has engaged in a course of conduct
that is at odds with the intent to exercise that right. Given the
broad scope of many arbitration provisions, it is difficult to imagine that a consumer who purchased a product intended to consent
to waive her right to litigate any and all claims associated with that
product.
For example, a consumer who buys a smart watch but does
not bother to read the mandatory arbitration agreement contained
in her bill of sale or warranty may have impliedly waived her right
to litigate a claim that the watch does not function properly. But
what if the watch explodes and burns her arm? Or what if the manufacturer fraudulently induced her to buy the watch in the first
place through factual misrepresentations? Did she really intend to
waive her right to bring a personal injury or consumer fraud lawsuit in court? I doubt it. Odds are she did not even contemplate the
smart watch exploding or the company defrauding her and assumed that the government would not have allowed the company
to fraudulently market or sell the product if it was not safe. If the
consequence of the smart watch exploding is that the consumer
suffered third degree burns up and down her arm, it is likely that
a lawyer would take her case and be able to litigate it in court on a
contingent fee. If the watch just stopped functioning because of the
4

Unconscionability, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). (Defining
unconscionability as a “basic test . . . of contract.”).
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explosion but did not injure the consumer, the consumer should be
entitled to a new watch or a refund of her money, but is probably
not going to recover any additional damages even if she pursued a
claim in court. If the consumer was told the watch was waterproof
up to 100 meters but it leaked, the consumer would be entitled to
the same relief. These latter two types of claims can be handled
well in an arbitration setting without depriving the consumer of a
right she might otherwise have exercised or a remedy she might
have obtained in court.
What if the smart watch explodes and causes first or second-degree burns that are painful but temporary? On the one
hand, the consumer probably never contemplated the watch exploding and therefore only impliedly agreed to waive her right to
bring such a claim. On the other hand, her claim probably is not
worth enough money to be litigated anywhere but in small claims
court without the assistance of a lawyer.5 Small claims courts are
characterized by lower filing fees, limited discovery, simplified
pleading and motion procedures, relatively quick resolution tracks,
and no class actions.6 Sound familiar? It should; these are the same
characteristics as consumer arbitrations. Since there is practically
no difference between the procedural rules used in the two fora,
forcing a consumer to bring her claim in arbitration – even though
she only “agreed” to do so via a contract of adhesion – does not
raise serious due process concerns. In contrast, requiring a consumer to arbitrate her serious personal injury claim rather than let
her paid lawyer prosecute that claim in non-small claims court
could seriously impact her due process rights.
II. IMPOSING MONETARY LIMITS ON MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
A simple means exists in most states to channel consumer
claims either to arbitration or to court where there is a mandatory
arbitration provision that a court finds to be a contract of adhesion:
minimum jurisdictional limits. In Illinois, for example, claims
worth $10,000 or less are handled in small claims court.7 Given the
court costs, litigation expenses and legal fees associated with prosecuting a claim in court, a consumer in Illinois with a $10,000 claim
5

In Illinois, for example, small claims courts handle disputes with
$10,000 or less at issue. IL R S CT Rule 281.
6
See e.g., IL R S CT Rules 282-289 (Illinois small claims procedures).
7
IL R S CT Rule 281.
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is going to have a very difficult time finding a lawyer to prosecute
that claim for her in court.8 Requiring a claim that would otherwise
proceed in small claims court without the assistance of a lawyer to
be resolved in arbitration would not adversely impact the consumer’s due process rights. Obviously not all states have the same
jurisdictional thresholds.9 But courts10 could take judicial notice of
the minimum monetary thresholds in the consumer’s state of residence to determine whether forcing her to arbitrate meaningfully
impacts rights she might have exercised by hiring a lawyer to bring
the claim in a forum other than the state’s small claims system.
This proposal would not, of course, prohibit companies
from arguing that their mandatory arbitration provisions are not
contracts of adhesion and ought to be enforced as written. To
strengthen that argument, companies could build into their arbitration provisions mechanisms to alert consumers to the due process consequences of their agreement to waive their due process
right to bring certain claims in court and of the option to submit
their claims, if eligible, to small claims proceedings.11 Companies
also could limit the scope of their arbitration provisions to claims
seeking the return of monies paid for a product or service or for a
replacement product or service, or the warrantability of either, and
8

If the case were filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
for example, the consumer would be required to pay a filing and jury fee
of approximately $300.00. If we assume her lawyer would need to spend
25 hours on the case to bring it to trial at an effective rate of $200/hr. and
incur litigation costs estimated at 10% of fees, it would not be profitable
for the lawyer to take the case under a standard 33% contingency arrangement.
9
According to one source, small claims court thresholds range between $2,500 and $25,000, see https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/small-claims-suits-how-much-30031.html.
10
It is now beyond dispute that the decision whether to enforce a mandatory arbitration provision under the Federal Arbitration Act is made by
courts, not arbitrators.
11
See e.g., American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process
Protocol Statement of Principles, Principle 11 (April 17, 1998),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf. (“Consumers should
be given: . . . clear and adequate notice of the arbitration provision and its
consequences . . .; reasonable access to information regarding the arbitration process, including basic distinctions between arbitration and court
proceedings, related costs . . .; notice of the option to make use of applicable
small claims court procedures as an alternative to arbitration…, etc.”).
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permit consumers to bring personal injury claims in court. Finally,
companies could provide in their consumer contracts that claims
worth less than a specified monetary threshold would be subject to
arbitration and that only claims that exceed that threshold could
be pursued in court.
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO MONETARY LIMIT
PROPOSAL
I can imagine concerns about the proposal I have outlined
from both consumer advocates and from companies that use mandatory arbitration agreements. Consumers might complain that it
will be expensive to litigate a case if they must hire a lawyer to
challenge the enforceability of the arbitration agreement to a claim
worth more than $10,000. That is true, but is already the case
where a company has included a mandatory arbitration provision
in its consumer “contracts.” Moreover, that concern could be ameliorated by allowing courts to order companies to pay the attorney’s fees of consumers who successfully prove an arbitration
agreement is unenforceable. Objectors might also point out that
arbitrators usually severely limit discovery, making it more difficult for consumers who do not have the same access to information
as companies to win their claims in arbitration. While this is generally accurate, most arbitrators are former judges or litigators
who understand this uneven playing field and have fairly broad
discretion under the rules governing arbitration to order a defendant to provide specific discovery.12
Consumer class action lawyers undoubtedly would object
to this proposal on the ground that it would inhibit their ability to
consolidate low dollar, consumer claims. Given the ubiquitous nature of mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts,
this concern seems overblown. Given most consumer product companies utilize these provisions and most courts are quick to enforce
them, class action lawyers already face restrictions on the types of
claims they can bring on a class basis. More importantly, the empirical evidence gathered by the Consumer Financial Protection
12

See e.g., American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process
Protocol Statement of Principles, Principle 13 (April 17, 1998),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf. (“No party should
ever be denied the right to a fundamentally-fair process due to an inability
to obtain information material to a dispute.”).
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Bureau shows that consumers who are willing to pursue their
claims on an individual basis prevail more frequently and recover
more money in arbitration than as a member of a class action in
court.13 While it is true that many consumers would not pursue
their claims in any forum but for the existence of a class action that
allows their claim to be adjudicated without their involvement, the
primary purpose of class action rules is not to give consumers a
vehicle to file lawsuits they would not otherwise file but rather to
help courts effectively manage a large number of related lawsuits
while ensuring that individual litigant’s due process rights are respected.14
Companies selling their products or services to consumers
might complain that, under my proposal, they would not enjoy the
“benefit of their bargain” with consumers. As discussed above, contracts of adhesion are by no means the result of real bargaining
with consumers, who are basically presented with a take-it-orleave-it proposition. Companies also might argue that this proposal could lead to consumer lawyers or class action lawyers exaggerating the size of consumers’ claims to ensure disputes ends up
in court. While this is certainly possible, courts are accustomed to
resolving disputes over monetary thresholds and presumably
would see through such chicanery. Finally, companies might argue
that leaving the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision to the vagaries of individual state jurisdictional thresholds
would lead to lack of predictability. A $10,001.00 claim in one state
would be litigated in court while that same claim in another court
would be subject to mandatory arbitration. This concern is valid
but, again, overstated. The vast majority of consumer claims are
worth less than the monetary maximum of any small claims court.
If the real concern of companies is that they will be inundated with
class actions where the average claim exceeds a state’s minimum

13

See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (May 24, 2016) (noting that a study by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection found
that 87% of class actions result in no compensation for consumers and that
the average class member recovery is $32.35 as opposed to $5,400 in arbitration).
14
Class actions can serve other, albeit subsidiary, purposes such as
encouraging the enforcement of consumer protection laws by private attorneys general. However, as discussed above, this article is not going to
wade into that controversial thicket.
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threshold for non-small claims, they can always specify in their arbitration provisions a higher monetary threshold than the state
provides for small claims and take their chances as to whether it
will be enforced. My proposal would cut down on the number of
class actions but not eliminate the more serious ones where a substantial amount of money is at stake in each consumer’s claim. To
me at least, this would reflect a better balancing of companies’ interest in directing consumers into arbitration with the due process
rights of consumers who have suffered serious losses or injuries
and never intended to waive their right to assert those claims in a
court of law.

